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Abstract. Argumentation games have been proved to be a robust and flexible
tool to resolve conflicts among agents. An agent can propose its explanation and
its goal known as a claim, which can be refuted by other agents. The situation is
more complicated when there are more than two agents playing the game.
We propose a weighting mechanism for competing premises to tackle with con-
flicts from multiple agents in an n-person game. An agent can defend its proposal
by giving a counter-argument to change the “opinion” of the majority of oppos-
ing agents. During the game, an agent can exploit the knowledge that other agents
expose in order to promote and defend its main claim.
1 Introduction
In multi-agent systems, there are several situations requiring a group of agents to settle
on common goals despite each agent’s pursuit of individual goals which may conflict
with other agents. To resolve the conflicts, an agent can argue to convince others about
its pursued goal and provides evidence to defend its claim. This interaction can be
modelled as an argumentation game [1,2,3]. In an argumentation game, an agent can
propose an explanation for its goal (i.e., an argument), which can be rejected by counter-
evidence from other agents. This action can be iterated until an agent either successfully
argues its proposal against other agents or drops its initial claim.
The argumentation game approach offers a robust and flexible tool to resolve con-
flicts by evaluating the status of arguments from agents. Dung’s argumentation seman-
tics [4] is widely recognised to establish relationships (undercut, defeated, and ac-
cepted) among arguments. The key notion for a set of arguments is whether a set of
arguments is self-consistent and provides the basis to derive a conclusion.
An argumentation game is more complicated when the group has more than two
agents. It is not clear how to extend existing approaches to resolve conflicts from multi-
ple agents, especially when agents have equal weight. In this case, the problem amounts
to deciding which argument has precedence over competing arguments. The main idea
behind our approach is the global collective preference over individual proposals, which
enables an agent to identify the key arguments and premises from opposing agents in
order to generate counter-arguments. These arguments cause a majority of opposing
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agents to reconsider their claims, therefore, an agent has an opportunity to change “at-
titudes” of others.
Each of our agents is equipped with its private knowledge, background knowledge,
and knowledge obtained from other agents. The background knowledge, commonly
shared by the group, presents the expected behaviours of a member of the group. Any ar-
gument violating the background knowledge is not supported by the group. The knowl-
edge about other agents, growing during the game, enables an agent to efficiently con-
vince others about its own goal. Defeasible logic is chosen as our underlying logic for
the argumentation game due to its efficiency and simplicity in representing incomplete
and conflicting information. Furthermore, the logic has a powerful and flexible reason-
ing mechanism [5,6] which enables our agents to flawlessly capture Dung’s argumen-
tation semantics by using two features of defeasible reasoning, namely the ambiguity
propagating and ambiguity blocking. Our paper is structured as follows. In section 2,
we briefly introduce notions of defeasible logic and the construction of the argumenta-
tion semantics. Section 3 introduces our n-person argumentation game framework using
defeasible logic. We present firstly the external model of agents’ interaction, which de-
scribes a basic procedure for an interaction between agents. Secondly, we define the
internal model, which shows how an agent can deal with individual knowledge sources
to propose and defend its goal against other agents. Finally, we show the justification of
arguments generated by an agent during the game w.r.t. the background knowledge of
the group. Section 4 provides an overview of research works related to our approach.
Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Background
In this section, we briefly present essential notions of defeasible logic (DL) and the
construction of Dung’s argumentation semantics by using two features of defeasible
reasoning including ambiguity blocking and propagating.
2.1 Defeasible Logic
Following the presentation in [7], a defeasible theory D is a triple (F,R,>) where F is
a finite set of facts, R is a finite set of rules, and > is a superiority relation on R. The
language of defeasible logic consists of a finite set of literals, l, and their complement
∼l.
A rule r in R is composed of an antecedent (body) A(r) and a consequent (head)
C(r), where A(r) consists of a finite set of literals and C(r) contains a single literal.
A(r) can be omitted from the rule if it is empty. There are three types of rules in R,
namely Rs (strict rules), Rd (defeasible rules), and Rdft (defeaters).
A conclusion derived from the theory D is a tagged literal and is categorised accord-
ing to how the conclusion can be proved:
– +∆q: q is definitely provable in D.
– −∆q: q is definitely unprovable in D.
– +∂q: q is defeasibly provable in D.
– −∂q: q is defeasibly unprovable in D.
The provability is based on the concept of a derivation (or proof) in D= (F,R,>). Infor-
mally, definite conclusions can be derived from strict rules by forward chaining, while
defeasible conclusions can be obtained from defeasible rules iff all possible “attacks”
are rebutted due to the superiority relation or defeater rules. A derivation is a finite se-
quence P= (P(1), . . . ,P(n)) of tagged literals satisfying proof conditions (which corre-
spond to inference rules for each of the four kinds of conclusions). P(1..i) denotes the
initial part of the sequence P of length i. In the follows, we present the proof conditions
for definitely and defeasibly provable conclusions1:
+∆ : If P(i+1) = +∆q then
(1) q ∈ F or
(2) ∃r ∈ Rs[q] ∀a ∈ A(r) : +∆a ∈ P(1..i)
+∂ : If P(i+1) = +∂q then either
(1) +∆q ∈ P(1..i) or
(2.1) ∃r ∈ Rsd [q] ∀a ∈ A(r) : +∂a ∈ P(1..i) and
(2.2) −∆∼q ∈ P(1..i) and
(2.3) ∀s ∈ Rsd [∼q] either
(2.3.1) ∃a ∈ A(s) :−∂a ∈ P(1..i) or
(2.3.2) ∃t ∈ Rsd [q] such that t > s and
∀a ∈ A(t) : +∂a ∈ P(1..i)
The set of conclusions of a defeasible theory is finite2, and it can be computed in
linear time [10].
DL can be extended by an ambiguity propagating variant [11,5]. The superiority
relation is not considered in the inference process. Inference with the ambiguity propa-
gation introduces a new tag Σ , a positive support for a literal +Σq is defined as:
+Σ : If P(i+1) = +Σq then ∃r ∈ Rsd [q]: ∀a ∈ A(r) : +Σa ∈ P(1..i)
+Σ p means p is supported by the defeasible theory and there is a monotonic chain
of reasoning that would lead us to conclude p in the absence of conflicts. A literal that
is defeasibly provable (+∂ ) is supported, but a literal may be supported even though it
is not defeasibly provable. Thus support is a weaker notion than defeasible provability.
2.2 Argumentation Semantics
In what follows, we briefly introduce the basic notions of an argumentation system
using defeasible reasoning. We also present the acceptance of an argument w.r.t. Dung’s
semantics.
1 For a full presentation and proof conditions of DL and its properties refer to [8,9].
2 It is the Herbrand base that can be built from the literals occurring in the rules and the facts of
the theory
Definition 1. An argument A for a literal p based on a set of rules R is a (possibly
infinite) tree with nodes labelled by literals such that the root is labelled by p and for
every node with label h:
1. If b1, . . . ,bn label the children of h then there is a rule in R with body b1, . . . ,bn and
head h.
2. If this rule is a defeater then h is the root of the argument.
3. The arcs in a proof tree are labelled by the rules used to obtain them.
DL requires a more general notion of proof tree that admits infinite trees, so that the
distinction is kept between an infinite un-refuted chain of reasoning and a refuted chain.
Depending on the rules used, there are different types of arguments.
– A supportive argument is a finite argument in which no defeater is used.
– A strict argument is an argument in which only strict rules are used.
– An argument that is not strict, is called defeasible
Relationships between two arguments A and B are determined by literals constituting
these arguments. An argument A attacks a defeasible argument B if a literal of A is the
complement of a literal of B, and that literal of B is not part of a strict sub-argument of
B. A set of arguments S attacks a defeasible argument B if there is an argument A in
S that attacks B.
A defeasible argument A is undercut by a set of arguments S if S supports an
argument B attacking a proper non-strict sub-argument of A. An argument A is undercut
byS means some literals of A cannot be proven if we accept the arguments inS .
The concepts of the attack and the undercut concern only defeasible arguments
and sub-arguments. A defeasible argument is assessed as valid if we can show that the
premises of all arguments attacking it cannot be proved from the valid arguments inS .
The concepts of provability depend on the method used by the reasoning mechanism
to tackle ambiguous information. According to the features of the defeasible reasoning,
we have the definition of acceptable arguments (definition 2).
Definition 2. An argument A for p is acceptable w.r.t. a set of arguments S if A is
finite, and
1. If reasoning with the ambiguity propagation is used: (a) A is strict, or (b) every
argument attacking A is attacked byS .
2. If reasoning with the ambiguity blocking is used: (a) A is strict, or (b) every argu-
ment attacking A is undercut byS .
The status of an argument is determined by the concept of acceptance. If an argument
can resist a reasonable refutation, this argument is justified. If an argument cannot over-
come attacks from other arguments, this argument is rejected. We define the sets of
justified arguments as follows:
Definition 3. Let D be a defeasible theory. We define JDi as follows.
– JD0 = /0
– JDi+1 = {a ∈ ArgsD| a is acceptable w.r.t. JDi }
The set of justified arguments in a defeasible theory D is JArgsD =
⋃∞
i=1 J
D
i .
3 n-Person Argumentation Game
In this section, we utilise the argumentation semantics presented in section 2.2 to model
agents’ interactions in an n-person argumentation game. Also, we propose a knowledge
structure which enables an agent to construct its arguments w.r.t. knowledge from other
agents as well as to select a defensive argument.
3.1 Agents’ Interactions
In an argumentation game, a group of agents A shares a set of goals G and a set
of external constraints Tbg represented as a defeasible theory, known as a background
knowledge. This knowledge provides common expectations and restrictions in A . An
agent has its own view on the working environment, therefore, can autonomously pur-
sue its own goal. In this work, we model interactions between agents to settle on goals
commonly accepted by the group. Also, at each step of the game, we show how an agent
can identify a goal and sub-goals for its counter arguments. This information is critical
for those agents whose main claims are refuted either directly by arguments from other
agents or indirectly by the combination of these arguments.
Settling on common goals. An agent can pursue a goal in the set of common goals G
by proposing an explanation for its goal. The group justifies proposals from individual
agents in order to identify commonly-accepted goals using a dialogue as follows:
1. Each agent broadcasts an argument for its goal. The system can be viewed as an
argumentation game with n-players corresponding to the number of agents.
2. An agent checks the status of its argument against those from the other agents.
There are three possibilities: (a) directly refuted if its argument conflicts with those
from others; (b) collectively refuted if its argument does not conflict with individual
arguments but violates the combination of individual arguments (See section 3.2);
(c) collectively accepted if its argument is justified by the combination (See section
3.3).
3. According to the status of its main claim, an agent can: (a) defend its claim; (b)
attack a claim from other agents; (c) rest. An agent repeats the previous step until
the termination conditions of the game are reached.
4. The dialogue among agents is terminated if all agents can pass their claims. For a
dispute, agents stop arguing if they do not have any more argument to propose.
Weighting opposite premises. In a dialogue, at each iteration, an agent is required
to identify goals and sub-goals which are largely shared by other agents. This infor-
mation is highly critical for agents, whose main claims are refuted either directly by
other agents or collectively by the combination of arguments from others in order to
effectively convince other agents.
To achieve that an agent, Ame, identifies a sub-group of agents, namely “opp-group”,
which directly or collectively attacks its main claim. Ame creates Argsopp as the set of
opposing arguments from the opp-group and Popp as the set of premises in Argsopp.
Essentially, Argsopp contains arguments attacking Ame’s claim. Each element of Popp
is weighted by its frequency in Argsopp. We define the preference over Popp as given
p1, p2 ∈ Popp, p2  p1 if the frequency of p2 in Argsopp is greater than that of p1.
Basically, the more frequent an element q ∈ Popp is the more agents use this premise
in their arguments. Therefore the refutation of q challenges other agents better than the
premises having lower frequency since this refutation causes a larger number of agents
to reconsider their claims.
Defending the main claim. At iteration i, Argsoppi represents the set of arguments
played by the opp-group:
Argsoppi =
|A |⋃
j=0
Args
A j
i s.t. Args
A j
i directly attacks Args
Ame
i
where ArgsA j is the argument played by agent A j. If A j rests at iteration i, its last argu-
ment (at iteration k) is used Args
A j
i = Args
A j
k . The set of opposite premises at iteration i
is:
Poppi = {p|p ∈ Argsoppi and p 6∈ ArgsAmei }
The preference over elements of Popp provides a mechanism for Ame to select arguments
for defending its main claim.
Example 1. Suppose that agent A1 and A2 respectively propose ArgsA1 = {⇒ e⇒ b⇒
a} and ArgsA2 = {⇒ e ⇒ c ⇒ a} whilst agent A3 claims ArgsA3 = {⇒ d ⇒ ∼a}.
From A3’s view, its claim directly conflicts with those of A1 and A2. The arguments
and premises of the opp-group are:
Argsoppi = {⇒ e⇒ b⇒ a;⇒ e⇒ c⇒ a} and Poppi = {a2,b1,c1,e2}
The superscript of elements in Poppi represents the frequency of a premise in Args
opp
i .
A3 can defend its claim by providing a counter-argument that refute ∼a – the major
claim of the opp-group. Alternatively, A3 can attack either b or c or e in the next step.
An argument against e is the better selection compared with those against b or c since
A3’s refutation of e causes both A1 and A2 to reconsider their claims.
Attacking an argument. In this situation, individual arguments of other agents do not
conflict with that of Ame but the integration of these arguments does. Agent Ame should
argue against one of these arguments in order to convince others about its claim.
At iteration i, let the integration of arguments be T INTi = Tbg
⋃|A |
j=0 T
i
j , where T
i
j is
the knowledge from agent j supporting agent j’s claim, and JArgsINT be the set of
justified arguments from integrated knowledge of other agents (See section 3.3). The
set of opposite arguments is defined as:
Argsoppi = a|a ∈ JArgsINT and a is attacked by ArgsAmei
and the set of opposite premises is:
Poppi = {p|p ∈ Argsoppi and (p 6∈ ArgsAmei or p is not attacked by ArgsAmei )}
The second condition is to guarantee that Ame is self-consistent and does not play any
argument against itself. In order to convince other agents about its claim, Ame is required
to provide arguments against any premise in Popp. In fact, the order of elements in Popp
offers a guideline for Ame on selecting its attacking arguments.
3.2 Agent’s Knowledge Structure
In this section, we present a knowledge structure which allows an agent to incorporate
background knowledge and knowledge exposed by individual agents during the game.
Also, we propose two simple methods to integrate knowledge sources w.r.t. ambiguity
information.
Knowledge representation. Agent Ame has three types of knowledge including the
background knowledge Tbg, its own knowledge about working environment Tme, and
the knowledge about others:
Tother = {Tj : 1≤ j ≤ |A |& excluding Tme}
where Tj is obtained from agent Agj during iterations and Tj is represented in DL. At
iteration i, the knowledge obtained from Ag j is accumulated from previous steps:
T ij =
i−1⋃
k=0
T kj +Args
Ag j
i
In our framework, the knowledge of an agent can be rebutted by other agents. It is rea-
sonable to assume that defeasible theories contain only defeasible rules and defeasible
facts (defeasible rules with empty body).
Knowledge integration. To generate arguments, an agent integrates knowledge from
different sources. Given ambiguous information between two sources, there are two
possible methods to combine them: ambiguity blocking is selected if the preference
between these sources is known; otherwise, ambiguity propagation is applied.
Ambiguity blocking integration. This method extends the standard defeasible reasoning
by creating a new superiority relation from that of the knowledge sources i.e. given two
sources as Tsp – the superior theory, and Tin – the inferior theory, we generate a new
superiority relation Rspd > R
in
d based on rules from two sources. The integration of the
two sources is denoted as TINT = Tsp B Tin. Now, the standard defeasible reasoning can
be applied for TINT to produce a set of arguments Args
TspBTin
AB .
Example 2. Given two defeasible theories
Tbg = {Rd = {r1 : e⇒ c;r2 : g, f ⇒∼c,r3 :⇒ e};>= {r2 > r1}}
Tme = {Rd = {r1 :⇒ d;r2 : d⇒∼a;r3 :⇒ g}}
The integration produces Tbg B Tme =
{Rd ={rTbg1 : e⇒ c;r
Tbg
2 : g, f ⇒∼c,r
Tbg
3 :⇒ e;rTme1 :⇒ d;rTme2 : d⇒ a;rTme3 :⇒ g};
>={rTbg2 > r
Tbg
1 }}
The integrated theory inherits the superiority relation from Tbg. That means the new
theory reuses the blocking mechanism from Tbg.
Ambiguity propagation integration. Given two knowledge sources T1 and T2, the rea-
soning mechanism with ambiguity propagation can directly apply to the combination
of theories denoted as TINT = T1+T2. The preference between two sources is unknown,
therefore, there is no method to solve conflicts between them. The supportive and op-
posing arguments for any premise are removed from the final set of arguments. The set
of arguments obtained by this integration is denoted by ArgsT1+T2AP .
3.3 Argument Justification
The motivation of an agent to participate in the game is to promote its own goal. How-
ever, its claim can be refuted by different agents. To gain the acceptance of the group,
at the first iteration, an agent should justify its arguments by common constraints and
expectations of the group governed by the background knowledge Tbg. The set of argu-
ments justified by Tbg determines arguments that an agent can play to defend its claim.
In subsequent iterations, even if the proposal does not conflict with other agents, an
agent should ponder knowledge from others to determine the validity of its claim. That
is an agent is required a justification by collecting individual arguments from others.
Justification by background knowledge. Agent Ame generates the set of arguments
for its goals by combining its private knowledge Tme and the background knowledge Tbg.
The combination is denoted as T ′me = Tbg B Tme and the set of arguments is ArgsT ′me . Due
to the non-monotonic nature of DL, the combination can produce arguments beyond
individual knowledges. From Ame’s view, this can bring more opportunities to fulfil its
goals. However, Ame’s arguments must be justified by the background knowledge Tbg
since Tbg governs essential behaviours (expectations) of the group. Any attack to Tbg is
not supported by members of A . Ame maintains the consistency with the background
knowledge Tbg by following procedure:
1. Create T ′me = Tbg B Tme. The new defeasible theory is obtained by replicating all
rules from common constraints Tbg into the internal knowledge Tme while main-
taining the superiority of rules in Tbg over that in Tme.
2. Use the ambiguity blocking feature to construct the set of arguments ArgsTbg from
Tbg and the set of arguments Args
T ′me
AB from T
′
me.
3. Remove any argument in ArgsT
′
me
AB attacked by those in Args
Tbg , obtaining the jus-
tified arguments by the background knowledge JArgsT
′
me = {a ∈ ArgsT ′meAB and a is
accepted by ArgsTbg}
Example 3. Consider two defeasible theories:
Tbg ={Rd = {r1 : e⇒ c;r2 : g, f ⇒∼c,r3 :⇒ e};>= {r2 > r1}}
Tme ={Rd = {r1 :⇒ d;r2 : d⇒∼a;r3 :⇒ g}}
We have sets of arguments from the background theory and the integrated theory:
ArgsTbg ={⇒ e;⇒ e⇒ c}
ArgsTbgBTme ={⇒ e;⇒ e⇒ c;⇒ d;⇒ g;⇒ d⇒∼a}
In this example, there is not any attack between arguments in ArgsTbg and Args
TbgBTme
AB .
In other words, arguments from ArgsTbgBTme are acceptable by those from ArgsTbg . The
set of justified arguments w.r.t. ArgsTbg JArgsT
′
me = Args
TbgBTme
AB .
Collective justification. During the game, Ame can exploit the knowledge exposed by
other agents in order to defend its main claims. Due to possible conflicts in individual
proposals, an agent uses the sceptical semantics of the ambiguity propagation reasoning
to retrieve the consistent knowledge. Essentially, given competing arguments an agent
does not have any preference over them, therefore, these arguments will be rejected. The
consistent knowledge from the others allows an agent to discover “collective wisdom”
distributed among agents in order to justify its claim.
The justification of collective arguments, which are generated by integrating all
knowledge sources, is done by the arguments from the background knowledge ArgsTbg .
The procedure runs as follows:
1. Create a new defeasible theory T ′′me = Tbg+Tme+Tother.
2. Generate the set of arguments ArgsT
′′
me
AP from T
′′
me using the feature of ambiguity
propagation.
3. Justify the new set of arguments JArgsT
′′
me = {a|a ∈ ArgsT ′′meAP and a is accepted by
ArgsTbg .
JArgsT
′′
me allows Ame to verify the status of its arguments for its claim JArgsT
′
me .
If arguments in JArgsT
′′
me and JArgsT
′
me do not attack one another, Ame’s claims are
accepted by other agents. Any conflict between two sets shows that accepting argu-
ments in JArgsT
′′
me stops Ame to achieve its claims in next steps. The set of arguments
Argsopp against Ame is identified as any argument in JArgsT
′′
me attacking Ame’s argu-
ments. Ame also establishes Popp to select its counter-argument. It is noticed that Ame is
self-consistent.
Example 4. Suppose the background knowledge Tbg and the private knowledge Tme of
Ame are:
Tbg = {Rd ={r1 : e⇒ c;r2 : g, f ⇒∼c};>= {r2 > r1}}
Tme = {Rd ={r1 :⇒ e;r2 : c⇒ d;r3 :⇒ g}}
Agent Ame currently plays {⇒ e⇒ c⇒ d} and knows about other agents:
Tother = {T1,T2} where T1 = {⇒ h⇒ f ⇒ b⇒ a} and T2 = {⇒ e⇒ c⇒ a}
The claim of A3 is acceptable w.r.t. arguments played by the other agents. However,
the combination Tbg + Tme +Tother shows the difference. This combination generates
{⇒ g,⇒ e,⇒ e⇒ f ⇒ b,⇒ g, f ⇒ ∼c}. {⇒ g, f ⇒ ∼c} is due to the superiority
relation in Tbg which rebuts the claim of A3. Therefore, the set of opposing arguments
Argsopp = {⇒ g, f ⇒∼c} and Popp = { f 1}. Given this information, A3 should provide
a counter-evidence to f in order to pursue c. Moreover, A3 should not expose g to the
other agents. Otherwise, A3 has to drop its initial claim d.
4 Related Work
Substantial works have been done on argumentation games in the artificial intelligence
and law-field. [1] introduces a dialectical model of legal argument, in the sense that
arguments can be attacked with appropriate counterarguments. In the model, the factual
premises are not arguable; they are treated as strict rules. [12] presents an early specifi-
cation and implementation of an argumentation game based on the Toulmin argument-
schema without a specified underlying logic. [13] presented the pleadings game as a
normative formalization and fully implemented computational model, using conditional
entailment.
Settling on a common goal among agents can be seen as a negotiation process where
agents exchange information to resolve conflicts or to obtain missing information. The
work in [14] provides a unified and general formal framework for the argumentation-
based negotiation dialogue between two agents. The work establishes a formal con-
nection between the status of a argument (accepted, rejected, and undecided) with an
agent’s actions (accept, reject, and negotiate respectively). Moreover, an agent’s knowl-
edge is evolved by accumulating arguments during interactions.
[3] presents an argumentation-based coordination, where agents can exchange ar-
guments for their goals and plans to achieve the goals. The acceptance of an argument
of an agent depends on the attitudes of this agent namely credulous, cautious, and scep-
tical. In [15], agents collaborate with one another by exchanging their proposals and
counter-proposals in order to reach a mutual agreement. During conversations, an agent
can retrieve missing literals (regarded as sub-goals) or fulfil its goals by requesting col-
laboration from other agents.
We have advantages of using DL since it flawlessly captures the statuses of argu-
ments, such as accepted, rejected, and undecided by the proof conditions of DL. The
statuses are derived from the notions of +∂ ,−∂ and +Σ corresponding to a positive
proof, a negative proof, and a positive support of a premise. Consequently, an agent
can take a suitable action either to provide more evidence or to accept an argument
from others. In addition, DL provides a compact representation to accommodate new
information.
Using DL to capture concepts of the argumentation game is supported by [16,17]
and recently [18,19]. [16] focuses on persuasive dialogues for cooperative interactions
among agents. It includes in the process cognitive states of agents such as knowledge
and beliefs, and presents some protocols for some types of dialogues (e.g. information
seeking, explanation, persuasion). [17] provides an extension of DL to include the step
of the adversarial dialogue by defining a meta-program for an alternative computational
algorithm for ambiguity propagating DL while the logic presented here is ambiguity
blocking.
We tackle the problem of evolving knowledge of an agent during iterations, where
the argument construction is an extension of [18,19], which define the strengthening of
an argument after each step in an argumentation game. [19] differs from [18] in distin-
guishing participants that one participant must provide a strong argument (i.e. a definite
proof) in order to defeat the other. In our work, we define the notion of collective accep-
tance for an argument and a method to weight arguments defending against opposing
arguments by using both features of ambiguity blocking and propagating.
The works in literature did not clearly show how an agent can tackle with conflicts
from multiple agents, especially when the preference over arguments is unknown. The
main difference in our framework is the external model where more than two agents can
argue to settle on goals commonly accepted by the group. Our weighting mechanism
enables an agent to build up a preference over premises constituting opposing arguments
from other agents. As a result, an agent can effectively select an argument among those
justified by the group’s background knowledge to challenge other agents.
We also propose the notion of collective justification to tackle the side-effect of ac-
cepting claims from individual agents. Individual arguments for these claims may not
conflict with one another, but the integration of these arguments can result in conflict-
ing with an agent’s claim. This notion is efficiently deployed in our work due to the
efficiency of defeasible logic in handling ambiguous information.
5 Conclusions
We presented an n-person argumentation game based on defeasible logic, which enables
a group of more than two agents to settle on goals commonly accepted by the group.
During an argumentation game, each agent can use knowledge from multiple sources in-
cluding the group’s constraints and expectations, other agents’ knowledge, and its own
knowledge in order to argue to convince other agents about its goals. The knowledge
about the group’s constraints and expectations plays a critical role in our framework
since this knowledge provides a basis to justify new arguments non-monotonically in-
ferred from the integration of different sources.
In this work, we propose a simple weighting mechanism, which is based on the
frequency of premises in arguments attacking an agent’s claim, in order to tackle the
problem of conflicts from multiple agents. In the future work, we will extend this mech-
anism to incorporate the notion of trustful arguments from trusted agents to better select
a rebuttal argument and resolve conflicts among agents.
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